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of claiming for his book the pretensions of a systematic treatise, but the limitations which he has imposed upon himself will not detract in any wise from the usefulness and value of the work presented.

From the adverse side, we believe the title does not accurately represent the matters treated, and yet we would have great difficulty in suggesting another. The index is not altogether satisfactory; for example the author's use of the terms "policy" and "principle" is important for an understanding of his argument, but they are not to be found in the index. This defect is in part relieved by a chapter summary which, by the way, no one should read as a substitute for the book. Scores of cases are discussed in the text, and, in several instances, this discussion is of considerable technical value, but there is no index of cases, although a few cases are entered in the general index.

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ALPHA AND OMEGA. By Jane Ellen Harrison, LL.D., Litt.D.
London: Sidgwick and Jackson Ltd., 1915. Pp. vii, 259.

"These scattered essays," says Miss Harrison in her preface, "bear the title *Alpha and Omega* because in subject they verge from primitive magic to post-Impressionism." They are, indeed, extraordinarily comprehensive in range and wide in sympathy. Most of the essays are altogether charming, glowing with humour and sparkling with wit, the products of a vivid and kaleidoscopic mind. But not all that Miss Harrison says should be taken too seriously. Many of the essays were given as addresses to societies at Cambridge and elsewhere; and a good deal must be regarded as of the nature of *jeu d'esprit* and *tour de force*. Still, there is a philosophy of life underlying these essays, and animating every one of them. It is a real philosophy, but it is instinct with so many conflicting tendencies that it is not easy to give it a name. Is it an emotional stoicism, or an altruistic individualism, an idealistic realism, or a benevolent anarchism? Is Miss Harrison a Mystical Positivist, or a Calvinistic Darwinist, or a Unanimist Heretic? A series of essays which make all these impressions on the reader's mind is naturally extremely interesting, though a trifle bewildering. The impos-

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sibility of classifying Miss Harrison's philosophy is due to what she has termed a resonance of her mind. In the essay entitled *Scientiæ Sacra Fames* she develops the view that while man's mind is essentially insulated and independent, woman's is resonant and sympathetic.

Miss Harrison's philosophical sympathies are wide enough to include William James and Dr. McDougall, Mr. Russell and Mr. Moore, and last but not least M. Bergson. Different as these thinkers are, they agree more or less in their reaction against intellectualism; and it is as a convinced anti-intellectualist that Miss Harrison appears in these essays. She agrees with the psychologists in insisting on the importance of the instincts and emotions of men as against his reason; she is at one with the realists in her extreme particularism, her conviction that the world consists of isolated reals, the relations between which are blatantly external; and she is a disciple of M. Bergson in the value she sets on immediate experience and intuition. Miss Harrison's resultant point of view is expressed in the sharp distinctions she everywhere draws between life and theory, feeling and thought, experience and reason, morality and ethics, and religion and theology. Life, feeling, experience, morality, and religion are in touch with reality, or rather, are themselves aspects of reality; but thought, theory, reason, ethics and theology are usually both superfluous and mischievous.

Miss Harrison's attitude to morality and ethics, is closely akin to the usual sociological standpoint. Miss Harrison says that we do not know enough about morality to justify us in copying the ethical attitude of praise and blame. Virtue and vice are very convenient labels. They are not real. Morality is a purely practical matter, which neither needs nor admits of ethical theory. It is defined as "a balance maintained between the interests of the individual and the interests of the race, the better relating of the two" (p. 137). Miss Harrison believes in the existence of distinct egoistic and altruistic sentiments in mankind, and holds that the truly moral life is that in which both are present in the proper proportion. This view implies (1) that morality is essentially a practical compromise; (2) that this compromise is rendered necessary by the radical inconsistency of the interests of the individual on the one hand, and of society on the other; and (3) that moral progress consists in the successful imposition of this compromise on the individual by the society (see p. 199).

In an epilogue Miss Harrison applies her point of view to the international situation. She finds that the Allies are inspired by an anti-intellectual realism. Realism is characteristic of modern Russian literature, France is being profoundly moved by an explicit and logical anti-rationalism, and Britain also is experiencing a vague but deep-seated anti-intellectualist reaction. But Germany has had neither part nor lot in this movement of salvation. "Untouched, it would seem, by modern realism, she still worships abstractions: she is a belated idealist" (p. 247). The mixture of truth and error in this application is a good example of what occurs more than once in this book. In spite of Miss Harrison's realism, in spite of her contempt of theory, she is constantly being dragged away from reality by her own theories. But from the point of view of the reader of these essays, that is no doubt clear gain; for reality, I suspect, is not nearly as interesting as Miss Harrison's theories.

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PROCEEDINGS OF THE ARISTOTELIAN SOCIETY. New Series. Vol. XVI. Containing the Papers read before the Society during the Thirty-Seventh Session, 1915-1916. London: Williams and Norgate, 1916. Pp. iv, 378. Price, 10s. 6d. net.

The papers in this volume which are of special ethical interest are two in number: "On the Relation of the Theoretic to the Practical Activity," by Miss Hilda D. Oakeley (pp. 133-155), and a symposium on "The Nature of the State in View of its External Relations," by Messrs. C. Delisle Burns, Bertrand Russell, and G. D. H. Cole (pp. 290-325). Miss Oakeley asks whether the attempt has ever been made to reach a philosophical satisfaction on the basis of practical life itself. Is the question a valid one *ab initio* or is it to be ruled out as self-contradictory, or may not the possibility of philosophically understanding practice have been hindered by the choice of the standpoint from which the subject has been in general approached? (p. 135). Mr. Burns argues that, both as to fact and as to principle, the traditional view of the nature of the state is vitiated because philosophers have failed to recognize the importance of external relations. Then he shows that the state is, among other things, an association of men with important moral relations to those